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A bstract
The paper proposes a simple model of wage setting and imperfect 
competition that takes into account knowledge and human capital accu­
mulation. We show that, given increasing returns to reproducible factors, 
transitory disturbances to output that originate on the demand side of 
the economy produce permanent upward shifts in the aggregate produc­
tion function.
'I  wish to thank Mark Salmon, Robert Waidmann and the participants in the Macroe­






















































































































































































1 In tr o d u c tio n
In this paper we introduce an explicit production technology into a business 
cycle model with nominal rigidities and in particular consider the effects of de­
mand disturbances, given increasing returns in the production of accumulable 
factors. As is well known, increasing returns in human and physical capital have 
represented the main mechanism in the recent wave of growth models. These 
however assume perfectly flexible prices thus ruling out the possibility of dise­
quilibrium unemployment, on which we now focus. A related question we ask is 
whether this kind of analysis can cast any light on empirical evidence from, for 
instance, Nelson and Plosser (1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1987), that the 
trend component of an economy’s GNP includes a substantial random element. 
These findings have undermined traditional views of the business cycles accord­
ing to which fluctuations are primarily driven by nominal disturbances that do 
not alter the long-run performance of the economy. Real business cycle models, 
which are based on the neoclassical growth model, generate a stochastic trend 
in output if the process governing the Solow residual contains a unit root.1 We 
consider instead the possibility that also transitory nominal shocks have per­
manent effects if growth mechanisms are taken into account. King, Plosser and 
Rebelo (1988) have already pointed out similar results for technology shocks 
and Bean (1990) for fiscal shocks. Path-breaking papers in this direction of 
research are Stadler (1986) and (1990). He shows using a model of wage set­
ting the possibility that when technology is endogenous through “learning by 
doing” there is long-run non-neutrality of money. Since he works in a perfect 
competition framework he has to to assume that knowledge is a pure public 
good, i.e. not only non-rival but also totally non-excludable. Moreover the 
way in which he models the supply-side of the economy technology implies an 
explosive or (implosive) process for per capita income. The specification of the 
supply-side of the economy proposed below, closer to the conventions of the 
new growth theory, avoids these shortfalls and makes clear the importance of 
constant returns in capital accumulation as a propagation factor due to which 
transitory nominal disturbances may have permanent effects. In other words 
we show that the same conditions on the accumulation of factors that deliver 
long-run growth in a deterministic environment imply hysteresis in the process 
for income in a stochastic environment if prices are not perfectly flexible, even 
in the absence of technological shocks. This shows that findings of a unit root
1See, for instance, Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983), King and Plosser 



























































































in the process for income may say very little about the forces driving the cycle.
2 T h e  M o d e l
We formalize our argument by means of a simple model of wage setting and 
imperfect competition, in the Gray-Fischer-Blanchard-Summers line.2 Nominal 
wages are generally set by contracts in unionized sectors so they cannot adjust 
quickly when economic conditions change and in even in industries not covered 
by formal contracts, implicit agreements between workers and firms may limit 
wage changes. The “right to manage assumption”, whereby firms treat wages 
as predetermined (although possibly the outcome of bargaining) and choose 
the level of employment unilaterally, rules out “efficient bargains” where there 
is bilateral bargaining between workers and management over employment.3 
However most unemployment researchers have assumed that the phenomenon 
is relatively unimportant at the aggregate level.4 Card (1988) points out that 
the weak aggregate correlation between employment and real wage, often cited 
as evidence against simple wage setting , monopoly union models, may be due 
to a Simultaneity bias, arising from the fact that the two variables are jointly 
determined in the labour market.5As is well known the persistence of unem­
ployment will be increased if contracts are staggered;6 however here we stick to 
the simplest case of contracts lasting just one period.
Firms and workers are assumed to know the structure of the model and the 
distribution of the innovation terms that enter the model and to form expecta­
tions that fully reflect that knowledge. The aggregate economy is composed of n 
monopolistically competitive firms. Uncertainty enters in the form of aggregate 
demand disturbances that affect all industries identically.
Each firm maximizes its stream of discounted expected profits:
2See Gray (1976), Fischer (1977) and Blanchard and Summers (1986).
3This insight is due to Leontief (1946). McDonald and Solow (1981) have shown that the 
locus of efficient contracts lies on the left of the labour demand curve with the two curves 
meeting at the workers’ reservation wage.
4See, among others, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) and McCurdy and Pencavel (1986).
5In particular the estimate will be biased when the parties involved in the contract are 
better able to forecast employment than an outside observer. Card finds for the Canadian 
manufacturing sector that when unanticipated real wage changes me used as an instrumental 
variable for contract wages employment is systematically negatively related to wages. He also 
finds no evidence that employment determination is related to outside wage rates in a manner 





























































































V = max E ( i )
00
E  03 (r i+t f +i -  K - t f + i  ~ n+iKUt) | h  
j = °
where L\ is employment by firm i, hired at the rental rate W{, P't the price at 
which it sells its product Ytl and rt is the rental rate of capital Kt. The notation 
E[-| /(] denotes the expectation conditional on information available at time t, 
/(. At time t, the demand facing each firm is given by:
y\ = -w(p| -  pt) + (mt -  pt) (2)
here and in what follows lowercase letters indicate logarithms. m t is the loga­
rithm of the stock of nominal money and pt the logarithm of the general price 
index defined as:
Pt = (E( ^ ) 1
u> is the constant elasticity of substitution between goods; when it goes to 
infinity we obtain the perfect competition case.The demand for each good can 
be derived assuming a quantity theory of money or a Clower constraint and the 
same CES index for consumption and investment.7
The utility function of each household (whose number is normalized to be 
equal to the number of firms) depends on C defined as:
CJ
C = n T ^ ( j 2 ( C i) ^ 1^  (4)
where we have suppressed the household’s index, since all households are iden­
tical and where C* is the purchase of the ith product as a consumption good.
The effect of investment on the accumulation of physical capital K t is 
given by:
Kt = Kt.  i + It—i (5)
where
1 =  n ( 6)




























































































and where I 1 is the purchase of the ith product as an investment good. 
Each firm operates with the same Cobb-Douglas technology:
y\ =  v K  +  01] +  ipkt +  r)at (7)
where a is human capital, defined as labour quality, assumed to be equal for all 
workers, and the paramater ip captures the external effects from average physical 
capital.8 The assumption of imperfect competition allows us to consider the case 
of increasing returns at the firm level, for instance fi > 1, whose implications 
for growth will be considered later.9 The absence of costs of adustment in the 
use of factors makes it possible to treat the firm’s problem like a one-period 
problem. From profit maximization and ignoring constants, here and in what 
follows, the following expression for labour demand can be obtained:
,i,d _  ~ K  +  ^  +  (1 -  £)(Pt +  UK +  ipkt +  vat) ,Q,
--------------------- i - w - i ) ------------------ (8)
Each firm is in a bargaining relationship with L workers and L is assumed 
fixed. The nominal wage is set one period in advance. The full information 
level of employment is assumed to be fixed at the level L*. Workers want to 
minimize the mean squared deviation of the logarithm of employment from its 
target level. Their problem is:
min£ [ ( / ( - / * ) 2 |
under the constraint represented by equation 8. Since the problem is a linear 
quadratic one its solution exhibits the certainty equivalence property, i.e. the 
nominal wage is set at the level implying that expected employment E[Lt \ 7(_i] 
is equal to L*. So eliminating expected employment in firm i from 8 we obtain:
wi = film ali + _ k)(E\pt\It-i} + yk] + ipkt + riat)
- ( 1 - / ? ( 1 -± ))I*  U
Assuming equality betwen individual and average stocks of physical capital we 
then have w\ = wti It = if- Substituting the expression for l\ from equation
8In human capital models, for instance in Lucas(1988), externalities from human capital 
are often considered. However since in the present model human capital is not a separately 
traded factor of production to introduce them would not change the analysis.




























































































8 in equation 7, the resulting expression for y\ in equation 2 and solving for p\ 
one gets:
P t
((! -  b)Pt + =*) (1 -  P) + l  (P™t -  (m +  VO** -  Wt)
( 10)
which makes clear that pt = p\, so that:
Pt =  (1 -  P)mt +  pwt -  (p +  ip)kt -  r]at (11)
From this it is clear that the real cost of capital will be the same for all 
firms so that the assumption of each firm hiring the same amount of capital is 
warranted. From equations 8 and 11, we then get:
if = mt - w t (12)
From equation 12 and the wage rule one infers that:
wt = E[mt\It-i} -  l* (13)
Hence:
It = rnt -  E[mt\It-i] + 1* (14)
Finally, the money supply is assumed to follow a random walk with posi­
tive drift. The drift is set by the central hank so as to avoid an ongoing deflation 
in a growing economy, given a constant velocity of money. The money supply 
rule is public knowledge. This is:
mt =  mt-i + n + et (15)
where the disturbance term e is a zero-mean stochastic error with constant 
variance.
Substituting the expression for lt given by equation 14 in the production 
function, after calculating the forecast error from equation 15, the following 
process for income is derived:




























































































So output depends on the level of physical and human capital and on 
technology, as well as on the full information level of employment. A positive 
value of et raises output as in all demand-side models of the business cycle 
with nominal wage contracting because it causes the price level to rise above its 
expected value and hence depresses the real wage increasing labour demand.
3 L on g ru n  G row th
We now come to the accumulation of factors of production. We first consider 
Stadler (1990), who endogenizes the growth process, introducing learning by 
doing not appropriable at the firm level in a perfect competition wage setting 
monetary model of the business cycle. He posits the following production tech­
nology:
y; = (L\)aZ l-a (17)
0 < a  < 1
Zt is a scale factor that represents accumulation of technical knowledge, which 
is assumed to evolve according to:
Zt — ?n-1 Yt-iLt-1
(Lt^ r (18)
0 < A, 7  < 1.
The evolution of technical knowledge therefore depends on the level of ag­
gregate labour input and aggregate labour productivity in the previous period. 
The first effect is due to the fact that the greater the level of labour input the 
greater the scope for learning and the acquisition of new skills. The second 
captures the persistence in productivity gains independent of changes in labour 
input for example through reorganization of the production process and firm 
structure to achieve greater efficiency. By substituting equation 17 in equation 
18 one obtains:
Z t  __ r  A ( a - l ) + 7




























































































The problem with this formulation is that equation 19 may imply explosive 
growth.10 1 Stadler invokes two possible solutions to this problem. The first 
is to assume, in equation 18, a coefficient on Z(_i equal to 1 —5, where 6 
is the rate of technology depreciation; explosive growth is then ruled out if 
5 =  A(1 — a). However this is clearly somewhat arbitrary. Alternatively he 
assumes a backward-bending labour supply: Ls =  (W /P)* , </> < 0. This implies 
the following expression for the market-clearing level of employment:
which, substituted in equation 19, allows one to write it as:
so that, what is needed in this case is that A =  —(fry. However the problem is 
that asymptotically employment will reach either its lower bound or its upper 
bound depending on whether 1 + <j)(\ — a) is positive or negative.
The following alternative does not suffer from these limitations and makes 
it easier to relate the analysis to the literature on growth. I consider a transition 
equation for human capital based on a Cobb-Douglas technology:
AK t Ai- 1 = A (22)
where <5i is the rate of depreciation. While in Lucas (1988) human capital is 
accumulated through formal schooling, here a different effect is at work, i.e. 
that having worked in the past makes workers more productive, as happens 
when there is “on the job training”. The importance of such effects is often 
emphasized in labour economics, especially with regard to the disenfranchise­
ment of long-term unemployed from the effective labour force and the related 
possibility of hysteresis in the natural rate of unemployment. Notice that, in 
offering labour, workers would in general take into account the increase in their 
human capital that being involved in production brings about, abstracting from 
external effects on labour.11 By symmetry, equation 22 can be written as:
At ■■■■ At~' = ? -  5! (23)
At-1
10This criticism is due to Aghion and Saint-Paul (1993).
11 In fact if we had assumed a unified labour market equilibrium employment would have 




























































































Coming to the accumulation of physical capital, we make the solovian 
behavioural assumption that the ratio of investment to income, s, is constant. 
We then have:
Kt -  K t-1
Kt-1
(24)
As regards capital accumulation we have a different form of “learning by 
doing”, closer to the one developed in Arrow (1962) and Sheshinski (1964) and 
revived in Romer (1986) who assume that technical progress is a by-product 
of producing and in particular of investing. These authors all assume perfect 
competition. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1987) notice however that “learning by 
doing” is consistent with perfect competition only on the unplausible condition 
that not even a fraction of the accumulation of knowledge that goes with the 
accumulation of capital can be appropriated at the firm level. In fact, other­
wise, assuming constant returns to scale as regards the rival factors, which is a 
consequence of the principle of replication, if factors were paid their marginal 
productivity, profits would be negative. This makes it advisable to assume in­
stead imperfect competition. Another way to look at the issue is to assume that 
part of the payments to capital are in fact R&D expenditures and that there is 
a fixed ratio between the stock of capital and the stock of technical ideas.12
In steady state monetary shocks do not impinge on the economy, as ex­
pectations are realized, Lss = L".
As can be seen by second-order differencing of at and kt, for A and K  to 
grow at a constant rate we need:
0 = ^1 ( l+ gq)W \
( i )
(25)
0 = s{L'YA°t^ K ^ - 1 ( l  -  (| 1++g* y ~ , - )  (26)
If ga = gk = g, the rate of balanced growth, is to be strictly positive, it 
must be that:
1 — £ — tì = x  + v , l  — fi — il> = a + T] (27)
12The idea that the future productivity of the economy is adversely affected by economic 




























































































This the usual condition of constant returns to scale to the producible 
factors in their own production. If 6\ = 62 = 6 it is possible to get a closed 
form for the steady-state rate of growth. This is:
/ ? ( v + x ) + ( C + v ) ( < 7 + n )  v+ x
g  =  -<5 +  ( £ ,* )  v+x+v+v ( 28)
This shows that the rate of saving and the equilibrium level of employment 
are positively related with the rate of growth, while the rate of depreciation is 
negatively related to it.13
4 F rom  th e  Sh ort to  th e  L on g-R u n
To study the transitional dynamics we will have to resort to some simplifying 
assumptions, in fact considering two different models nested in the general one 
used for steady state analysis.
In the first model, as is in the Arrow-Sheshinski-Romer tradition, human 
capital does not enter the production function, i.e. 77 = 0
Now consider the hypothesis that the “learning by doing” effect is not so 
strong as to deliver constant returns to scale to the accumulable factor. This 
implies that /r + ip < 1. The steady-state level of physical capital is:
K,1SS
( s(L*)0\  1—V"—M
( 29)
We will show that given these assumptions on technology, an innovation in 
the process governing money supply cannot have permanent effects. Suppose, 
for instance, that, starting from a situation of steady-state equilibrium, we 
have at time t a positive forecast error, so that Lt > L*. To isolate the effect 
of this single shock, let us assume that in all subsequent periods expectations 
are realized, i.e. Ls =  L* for all s > t. But then there will be a positive net
13This is true even with different rates of depreciation as can be seen by considering the 
following equation in g:
ff(t'+X) + (C+t/)(g+*7)
a(L*) ***
9 + 62 = ------------- 5+5-------
We have on the left-hand side of the equation a linear function of g and on the right-hand 
side a hyperbola. By analysing how the intersection between the two curves moves when the 




























































































investment, i. e. Kt+1 > K t — K ss, since, from equation 24, and considering 
equation 29:
s l fK j* * -1 - S 2 >0  (30)
However subsequently capital will decumulate, since the same equations 
imply for Ks > Kss :
s{L')0K?+* -1 - S 2 < 0 (31)
The reduction in the stock of capital will go on until the stationary-state 
level is reached again, with a velocity of convergence depending on parameters.
Now consider instead the case of constant returns. Equation 24 can then 
be rewritten, approximating:
kt =  kt~i + sLf^j — S2 (02)
but since from equation 7 we have:
kt- i = yt- i -  0h-i (33)
we obtain, substituting in equation 16, the following data generating process 
for income:
Vt = Vt-1 - S 2 + 0(et -  ff-i) + s(L*)3exp0et-\  (34)
The process is integrated of order one and the structure of the error term 
is such that shocks will have permanent effects. This is clear by considering the 
impulse response function:
t-i
Vt = Vo + S 2t + /3(et -  e0) + s(L*)/J ^  exp0et-t (35)
i=0
In the second particular case it is the role of physical capital to be ab­
stracted from, as done in Stadler (1990), i.e. y. + rp = 0 and y +  w = 0. If 
£ +  < 1, the steady- state level of human capital will be:
A l  = (L*)v+<\ (36)
If we start with this stock of human capital any shock raising employment 




























































































However this over-accumulation will subsequently be undone, unless further 
shocks occur in the same direction of the first.
Again for long-run growth we need constant returns to scale, i.e. ui+0 =  1. 
Through manipulations analogous to those just described we again get a unit 
root process for income:
Vt = Vt-1 -  <$i +  -  et-i) + (T*)c+1’ exp(C + v)et-i (37)
and
t-1
Vt = Vo -  + p(et -  £o) + (L')<+v ^ (C  + v) exp /3et-i (38)
i=0
So it is clear from the analysis of both models that “learning by doing” , 
when it is not strong enough to avoid decreasing returns can deliver persistence 
not hysteresis. The following assertion by Stadler (1990) is therefore somewhat 
too general. He writes: “when technology is dependent on demand conditions, 
monetary shocks have a permanent impact on output. There is a long-run non­
neutrality of money in models with endogenous technology”. However I have 
shown that endogeneity per se is not sufficient to get the result.
On the other hand, when the condition for unbounded accumulation holds, 
i.e. the presence of non decreasing returns to the producible factors, nominal 
demand disturbances will have permanent hysteretic effects, through their influ­
ence on the supply-side of the economy. In fact output is a difference-stationary 
process that depends upon the sum of all past monetary misperceptions.
In our approach to the study of the interactions between growth and busi­
ness cycles, recessions have therefore negative long-run effects on productivity. 
Some recent theoretical papers have instead revived the “schumpeterian” view 
of recessions as providing a mechanism for reducing resource misallocations so 
they have a long-run positive effect on productivity. Caballero and Hammour 
(1991) have used a model of “creative distraction” to show that economic down­
turns have cleansing effects on outdated techniques and products. Hall (1991) 
has emphasized the role of “organizational capital”, whose accumulation would 
increase during a slump. These and other studies (see the survey by Aghion 
and Saint-Paul 1993 ) rely on intertemporal substitution of productivity in­
creasing activities, whose opportunity cost falls during a recession. We wish 
to underline that the two views, the “kaldorian” and the “schumpeterian”, are 




























































































productivity through reorganization efforts etc., and negative effects, through 
reduced “learning by doing”, “on the job training” etc. The question of which 
kind of effects prevail is in fact an empirical one and the evidence so far is 
mixed. Gali and Hammour (1993) and Saint-Paul (1993) using economy-wide 
data have found that the long-run response of productivity to demand shocks 
is negative, which supports the “Schumpeterian” view. Jimenez and Marchetti 
(1994), using a panel data set of 402 four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries 
find, on the contrary, that such response is positive or positively close to zero 
depending on the industry.14We can conclude that both views deserve therefore 
further investigation theoretically and empirically.
5 C o n clu d in g  R em ark s
The possibility that demand shocks have permanent effects contradicts a long 
tradition in macroeconomic theory: fluctuations in economic activity are gen­
erally studied in a “short term” framework in which the capital stock and pro­
ductivity are kept constant. Conversely the supply of capital and labour play 
the central role in understanding growth, but inflation and short term demand 
disturbances are ignored. The above separation is removed in Stadler (1986) 
and (1990). The present paper has proposed a monetary, imperfect competition 
model of the business cycle, in which knowledge accumulation internal and ex­
ternal to firms is taken into account. The specification of the technology avoids 
some limitations and counterfactual implications of Stadler’s models, regarding 
in particular the appropriability of knowledge and the explosive character of 
growth. Furthermore, being in the mould of most endogenous growth models, 
makes it easier to clarify the link between the conditions for endogenous growth 
and hysteresis in per capita income.
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